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1 Introduction1 
This paper compares voters’ and policymakers’ attitudes towards unemployment and inflation in the 
last four decades of European history. Through this period the state of the European economic 
situation has changed considerably and important institutio al changes have transformed the 
constraints faced by policymakers.  
In order to analyze voters’ preferences, voting functions were estimated for a panel of 13 E.U. 
countries from 1960 to 1997. In the 1960's European unemployment rates were very low, but they 
increased significantly after the first oil shock and have been persistently high since then. In fact, 
average unemployment for European Union (E.U.) countries is currently above 10%, while inflation 
has returned to levels similar to the 1960's. Whether this shift in unemployment and inflation 
performance has been accompanied by political repercussions for incumbent politicians is a question 
of interest. Did voters punish governments for rising levels of unemployment and reward them for 
decreasing inflation? Did the increase and persistence of unemployment lead to a switch to the left in 
voters' ideological preferences, as partisan theory predicts? In order to achieve economic integration 
Europe has been passing through a series of institutional changes that reduced the power of 
governments to act independently in response to country-specific macroeconomic shocks. Whether 
voters were aware of the new policy constraints and took them into account in their electoral choices is 
another question under study. 
Regarding policymakers preferences, I investigate whether adopted monetary policy responses 
to inflation or unemployment shocks have changed over time by estimating monetary policy reaction 
functions, with time-varying parameters, for the U.S. and Germany. These two countries have great 
influence on World and, especially, European monetary conditions. For the other E.U. countries in the 
sample, an analysis of real short-term interest rates behavior over time was performed.  
                                            
1 I acknowledge helpful comments from Henry Chappell Jr., McKinley Blackburn, participants at the 1999 
European Economic Association Annual Congress in Santiago de Compostela, and at the XIIth World Congress 
of the International Economic Association in Buenos Aires. Financial support was provided by the PRAXIS-XXI 
program, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia - Portugal. 
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The essay is divided into two sections. The first one investigates voters' attitudes towards 
unemployment and inflation, while the second focuses on policymakers. Finally, conclusions are 
presented comparing the two groups' attitudes. 
 
2 Electoral Results and the European Economic Situation 
From 1950 to 1970 all major industrialized economies were near full employment. However, after the 
first oil shock unemployment increased in most countries, particularly within the European Union. All 
reported nations suffered increases in unemployment in the 70's and 80's, with average unemployment 
for the fifteen E.U. countries doubling from one decade to the other. In the 90's Belgium, Denmark, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, and the U.K. managed to slightly reduce it, but unemployment in the 
other E.U. countries rose and average unemployment for the fifteen nations increased. However, 
inflation rates behaved in the opposite direction. They suffered a major increase in the 1970's mainly 
due to the oil shocks, but have been continuously decreasing since then. In fact, for all reported 
countries, except Portugal, average inflation in the 1990's was lower than in the 1960's. 
Although voters are not expected to know exactly how to solve the economic problems that 
affect them, they are expected to react t  economic changes and express their opinions about 
policymakers through voting. Thus, one would predict that incumbents would be rewarded for 
decreasing inflation and punished for rising unemployment. Furthermore, partisan theory (Swank, 
1993, 1998) would predict that right-wing governments would be punished more heavily for increases 
in unemployment than left-wing governments, and the reverse for inflation.2  
Visser and Wijnhoven (1990) analyzed these questions and concluded that conservative 
governments were not punished for mass unemployment in Europe during the 1980s'. They argue that 
ideological discourse played an important role in this process; by developing a notion of "what is 
good/bad" and "what is (im)possible," parties influenced voters’ percepti ns and values. They suggest 
that since incumbent parties are not forced to change their policies due to mass unemployment, mass 
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unemployment could become permanent. The record of the 1990’s does not immediately falsify this 
hypothesis, since European unemployment remained high while political turnover was not unusually 
high. 
In what follows, I investigate the determinants of electoral results in European Union 
countries by estimating an aggregate voting model that accounts for governments’ identities, and the 
possibility that standards of evaluation may have changed over time.  
 
2.1 The Empirical Model 
The starting point for the literature on vote and popularity functions is the proposition that voters hold 
the government responsible for economic conditions. This idea was first introduced by Downs (1957), 
who hypothesized that voters assess expected future utilities under competing candidates, and that the 
popularity of the incumbent is a positive function of assessments of his performance. A good review of 
the early literature can be found in Nannestad and Paldam (1994).  
The voting functions estimated in this paper are of the following form: 
  
DVit = a0 + a1 VPREVit + a2 TIMEGit + bE(xit) +  ut        (1) 
  
The dependent variable consists of the election- o-election change in the percentage of votes 
received by incumbent parties in country i at time t. The underlying idea is that changes in votes for 
incumbents are a function of their vote share in the previous elections (VPREVit), heir time in office 
(TIMEGit), and overall economic performance [E(xit)]. Economic performance can be measured by 
multiple variables, including changes in unemployment, changes in inflation, real GDP growth and 
real private consumption growth, or the same variables expressed as deviations from the European 
average.3  
                                                                                                                                
2 The logic behind this argument is that right and left parties have differing competencies. For example, left 
parties may be seen as better able to deal with unemployment. Thus, when unemployment rises there is a 
tendency for voters to fav r leftist parties, regardless of which currently governs. 
3 Chappell and Veiga (1999) have analyzed the issue of how to measure standards of economic performance. 
They argue that although voters are concerned with growth, unemployment, and inflation, good economic 
performance should be judged in relation to what is feasible, as well as what is desirable. Among the variety of 
economic performance indicators they evaluated as explanatory variables for election outcomes, were deviations 
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Previous studies of voting functions using panel data have measured economic variables as 
four-quarter averages or have included several lagged values of each variable. These specifications 
imply that voters do not take into account the evolution of economic series during the first years of 
incumbency.4 Although it is possible that voters have short memories, this is a point that deserves 
further investigation. In this essay, economic performance is alternatively measured over the last year 
of a government's term and over the entire period a government has been in office. 
The percentage of votes obtained by incumbent parties when previously elected is included as 
an independent variable since governments with higher initial support are likely to have stronger 
erosion of their images. The same is true for governments that have been in office longer. Thus, 
negative signs for estimated coefficients on these variables are expected. Regarding economic 
performance, conventional hypotheses predict negative coefficients for unemployment and inflation 
and a positive coefficient for real GDP growth and real private consumption growth.  
This paper also analyzes whether ideological issues influence voters' assessment  of 
incumbents' economic performance. Partisan theory, introduced by Hibbs (1977) is based on the 
hypothesis that politics is about the distribution of income; parties in office manipulate the economy in 
order to favor their constituencies. It assumes that the lower classes of the population are mainly 
supporters of left-wing parties, and that they are more averse to unemployment and less averse to 
inflation than the richer classes who tend to support right-wing parties. 
Although partisan effects in macroeconomic outcomes such as unemployment, inflation, and 
growth have been tested by several authors,5 the theory has evolved as a separate stream from the 
voting functions literature. In fact, there is not much research in economic literature that incorporates 
partisan theory in voting models. Swank (1993, 1998) developed a voter model where voters’ choices 
reflect understanding of partisan reputation for certain policies. The underlying idea is that when 
                                                                                                                                
of real variables from trend. Their results indicate that simpler measures of economic performance such as 
changes in national series or performance relative to the European average performed best. Therefore, in this 
study only these measures are considered. 
4 If true, this would give incumbents an incentive to manipulate the economy before elections, generating a 
Nordhaus' political business cycle (Nordhaus, 1975).  
5 See, among others, Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1997) for tests of political business cycles in industrialized 
economies.  
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unemployment increases, the demand for expansionary policies rises, turning left-wing policy 
proposals more attractive. The reverse occurs when inflation increases, generating more support for 
conservative policies.  
In a situation of rising and persistent unemployment one would therefore predict an increase in 
left-wing governments in Europe. In order to take ideological issues into account, a dummy equal to 
one when a right-wing government is in office and zero otherwise was included in the model both 
independently and interacted with each economic variable. A positive sign is expected on the 
interaction variables with inflation and growth, while a negative sign is expected for the interaction 
variable with unemployment. 
Another issue emphasized here, but not analyzed in Chappell and Veiga (1999), is that of the 
stability of parameters over time. This is important because I employ long time series, covering almost 
four decades of data. Furthermore, one of this paper's goals is to analyze whether voters’ concerns 
with unemployment and inflation have changed over time, and to determine whether the institutional 
changes that European countries have implemented in the process of forming a monetary union have 
changed the way voters hold incumbents responsible for macroeconomic outcomes.  
In sum, I am particularly interested in determining: (1) whether governments are held 
responsible for macroeconomic outcomes; (2) whether governments' ideologies influence voters' 
assessments of incumbents' macroeconomic performances; (3) whether the way voters hold 
governments responsible for economic conditions has changed over time. 
 
2.2 Empirical Work: Voting functions 
The analysis uses a data set covering 136 parliamentary elections in 13 European nations (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherl nds, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom) from 1960 to 1997. Political data consists of parliamentary election results, 
namely votes received by incumbent parties, time in office, governments' ideological orientations, and 
the number of parties forming a government.6 Si ce unstable governments are less likely to be held 
                                            
6 Details of the political data sources are provided in appendix 1. 
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responsible for macroeconomic results, only elections separated by at least one year and governments 
whose composition was unchanged in the year before an election were included in th sample used for 
estimation. This decision resulted in the exclusion of nine elections. Caretaker governments formed to 
rule during political crises were also excluded from the sample. 
Economic data consists of unemployment, inflation, growth of GDP and growth of private 
consumption. Unemployment series were obtained from OECD-Main Economic Indicators, all other 
series were collected from the IMF-International Financial Statistics. 
Controls for country fixed effects were performed by including a consta t and dummies for 
each individual country except one. For all regressions, an F-test for the coefficients for the dummies 
was performed to determine if these coefficient estimates were jointly statistically significant. In most 
regressions I could reject the hypothesis that these dummy variables were jointly equal to zero. 
Therefore, although the coefficients on the dummies are not reported in the tables, a fixed-effects 
model was employed. 
 
Economic Variables and Electoral Results  
Table 1 presents results for specifications where economic variables are measured alternatively as 
four-quarter averages of changes in national performance or in deviations of performance from the 
E.U. average. Both the percentage of votes for incumbents when previously elected and the number of 
quarters in office are statistically significant and negatively affect the change in vote share for 
incumbents. This is in accordance with the idea that governments with a higher base and longer time 
in ofice have higher costs of ruling. Among the economic variables, changes in inflation, especially 
when measured relative to the European average, appear as the main economic determinant of 
electoral results. Among real variables, only real GDP growth is marginally ignificant and correctly 
signed in the second specification.  
[Table 1] 
Since voters may take into account the entire period a government has been in office (rather 
than just the year before the election), economic performance was alternatively measured over the 
entire term. Results presented in Table 2 indicate that voters reward governments for increases in real 
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GDP and real private consumption but don’t hold them responsible for inflation or unemployment.
These results, when compared with the previous ones, suggest that voters have short memories of 
inflation. Voters hold governments responsible for real GDP growth and real private consumption 
growth over the entire term, not just for the last year in office; and the opposite occurs with inflation. 
Possible explanations are that real conditions take longer than nominal conditions to be perceived by 
voters or that inflation responds to policy with a longer lag and therefore, voters do not hold 
incumbents responsible for it in the early quarters of an administration. 
[Table 2] 
 
Right versus Left-Wing Governments 
To test whether voters hold conservative governments more responsible for certain economic 
variables than left-wing governments, a dummy equal to one for right-wing governments and zero 
otherwise, as well as interactions of this dummy with the economic variables were added to the model. 
The model was again estimated using averages of economic performance over the last 4 quart s and 
all quarters in office. Results did not generate any clear evidence that voters hold incumbents from 
different ideologies more responsible for some economic variables than others. Splitting the sample 
between left and right wing oriented governments stressed this finding. I therefore conclude that the 
evidence does not establish the existence of partisan effects in European electoral results.  
 
Structural Breaks in Parameter Estimates           
Because the sample is long, including almost four decades of data, tests for structural breaks in 
parameter estimates were performed. Breaks were considered first according to the history of 
European unification and then, according to the behavior of economic variables. 
Having in mind that the European integration process may have decreased (increased) 
governments’ responsibility for national (relative) economic conditions in voters’ eyes, I start by 
analyzing two dates: 1979 and 1989. It is thought that the degree of political manipulation of the 
economy may have fallen in the 1980's due to the creation of the European Monetary System (1979), 
which instituted a system of semi-pegging parities among its participants. The beginning, in 1989, of 
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the first stage of the creation of a monetary union may also have had an impact on the extent to which 
voters hold governments responsible for economic conditions. This stage had as major objectives the 
removal of all capital controls, the reduction of inflation and interest rate differentials among member 
states, an increase in exchange rate stability in the European Monetary System (E.M.S.), and an 
increase in policy coordination. To test these hypotheses, interactions of time dummies (1979:Q1 to 
1988:Q4; 1989:Q1 to 1997:Q4) with the economic variables were included in the model. Results 
suggest voters’ perceptions of incumbents' responsibility did not change with the process of European 
integration.  
Tests for structural breaks were also performed based on economic series behavior. The 
underlying argument is that the electorate may hold incumbents more responsible for a certain 
economic variable when that variable moves beyond acceptable levels. Three splits were considered 
based on the levels (5%, 7% and 9%) of average European unemployment and inflation. Results were 
predominantly negative, suggesting that the degree of governments' responsibility for economic 
conditions in voters' eyes did not vary over time. 
 
3 Policymakers' Beliefs About the Behavior of the Economy 
The empirical results provide some evidence that European voters punish governments for increases in 
inflation, especially when measured relatively to the European average, and reward them for real GDP 
growth. However, there is little evidence that unemployment affects election outcomes. Why don’t 
European voters punish policymakers for increases in unemployment, especially when other 
industrialized nations like the U.S. and Japan have much lower levels of unemployment? 
To understand why voters seem so unconcerned with unemployment it is important to analyze 
policymakers' beliefs about the behavior of the economy and the capacity of adopted macroeconomic 
policies to have real effects. A shift in policymakers' attitudes from Keynesian interventionist ideas to 
neo-liberal beliefs that attribute a lower level of r sponsibility to governments for economic outcomes, 
especially unemployment, may provide an explanation for why voters do not punish governments for 
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rising unemployment. This change in attitudes may also be associated with the success of European 
economic integration, which in turn made the need to adopt conservative policies even stronger.  
According to McNamara (1998), the creation of a consensus on conservative policies among 
the leaders of European states in the 1970's was critical to the development of European monetary 
cooperation.7 She suggests three reasons for the development of this neo-liberal co sensus. First, the 
apparent failure of Keynesian interventionist policies after the first oil shock. Second, monetarist ideas 
suggested viable alternatives for ending stagflation. Third, an example for emulation was provided by 
Germany, which adopted conservative monetarist policies and managed to overcome the economic 
problems created by the oil shocks better than any other European state. In the author’s opi ion the 
U.S. experience was also seen by European leaders as an example to follow. These four explanations 
are explored further below. 
The failure of Keynesian policies after the oil shock of 1973 reopened the debate on how the 
economy works and the role of the government in the macroeconomy, creating conditions facilitating 
the appearance of a new paradigm. The diminishing effectiveness of Keynesian monetary policies may 
have increased governments' desires to subordinate monetary policy to the constraints of ex hange rate 
cooperation. 
By the 1960, monetarist ideas had begun to offer an appealing alternative to Keynesianism. 
According to the monetarist policy viewpoint each economy has a “non-acceler ti g inflation rate of 
unemployment” (NAIRU), which is independent of the rate of inflation and therefore, unaffected by 
monetary policy (Friedman, 1968). Although monetarist ideas were developed in an environment of 
adaptive expectations, the rational expectations revolution strengthened this point (Lucas, 1973). 
Attempts to “fine-tune” the economy were thought likely to increase the variability of output rather 
than decrease. A stable, predictable growth of the money supply was viewed as the best way to reduce 
inflation and achieve economic growth. Most European countries started adopting monetary targeting 
                                            
7 Collins and Giavazzi (1993) also tried to understand the E.M.S. success. They argue that private sector attitudes 
towards unemployment and inflation have shifted within E.M.S. members. They argue, in particular, that during 
the 1980's traditionally high-inflation countries became less tolerant of inflation relatively to unemployment, 
while the reverse occurred in states that initially had low-inflation rates. The development of common attitudes 
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by the mid-1970's.8 However, besides adopting monetary targets, governments viewed the fixing of 
their exchange rates as another way to reinforce their ability to reduce inflation. Moreover, the 
reduction of unemployment was only considered to be possible by the adoption of supply-side 
policies, aimed at the elimination of structural problems.  
Germany’s success in fighting inflation with a strong and independent central bank that 
adopted restrictive, w ll-informed, monetary policies and defended a strong currency constituted an 
example to follow. The Bundesbank kept interest rates high, and in 1974, began announcing monetary 
aggregate targets. It played a leading role in fighting inflation. Germany stood out as the most 
successful European country in solving the problems created by the oil crisis, and was thus generally 
viewed by the European leaders as an example of monetarist policies worth following.  
Finally, when comparing E.U. and U.S. macroeconomic performance in the last 40 years it is 
clear that they both had low levels of inflation and unemployment in the 60's, and that during the 70's 
there was a big increase on inflation, mainly due to the oil shocks. However, during the 80's and 90's 
the U.S. managed to substantially decrease inflation and unemployment rates, while Europe was only 
able to decrease inflation. The U.S. success in overcoming stagflation was achieved with conservative 
macroeconomic policies, and reliance on free market principles.9 Furthermore, the U.S., like Germany, 
has one of the most independent central banks. Therefore, the U.S. experience may also have 
constituted an example to imitate. 
These points certainly contributed to the creation of a conservative consensus among 
European policymakers, which was critically important to the maintenance of the E.M.S.10 and t  
                                                                                                                                
toward inflation and unemployment facilitated convergence in inflationary performance, therefore contributing 
to the E.M.S. success.  
8 See OECD, “Monetary Targets and Inflation Control,” M etary Studies Series (Paris: OECD, 1979). 
9 Refer to Palley (1996) for the change in attitudes from Keynesian interventionist ideas to monetarist polices in 
the U.S.. 
10 Increasing the credibility of the E.M.S. as an institution was critical for success in reducing inflation, which in 
turn contributed to the reinforcement of conservative ideas. To understand why the E.M.S. contributed to success 
in reducing inflation, one should recall the “time-inconsistency problem” first illustrated by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977). With rational agents, anticipated expansionary monetary policies do not have real impacts, 
however if increases in the money supply are not fully anticipated they generate real impacts until expectational 
errors are corrected. Therefore, governments could be tempted to adopt one-sho  expansionary policies. Rational 
agents, by understanding this incentive, take it into account in their expectations, which, by itself, creates 
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revival of the European Monetary Union (E.M.U.) project. For the E.M.U. to succeed governments 
had to consider exchange rate stability and inflation controls as primary goals. Therefore, levels of 
unemployment that would have been considered unacceptable some years ago are now considered 
“normal”. 
 
3.1 Testing the Creation of a Conservative Consensus on Monetary Policy  
For European integration to succeed governments had to abdicated from using monetary policy to 
stabilize real national variables and have kept real interest rates high in an era of low inflation.11 The 
purpose of this sub- ection is to investigate the empirical foundations of these arguments. I start by 
presenting evidence for the two countries (U.S. and Germany) that have been hypothesized to be the 
providers of successful conservative monetary policies, that later spread to other E.U. nations. I 
subsequently extend the analysis to the other countries. 
 
3.1.1 U.S. and Germany  
Figure 1 illustrates inflation and short-term nominal interest rates for the U.S. and Germany. In both 
countries, real interest rates were low during the sixties. The increase in inflation in the seventies led to 
the adoption of high real interest rate policies and these policies have continued thereafter even though 
we are now in an era of low inflation. Furthermore, the U.S. managed to reduce unemployment 
simultaneously with inflation, but Germany and the other E.U. c unt ies did not. 
[Figure 1] 
To find out if monetary policy responses to the state of the economy have changed over time, 
time-varying parameter monetary policy reaction functions were estimated for the U.S. and Germany, 
                                                                                                                                
inflation. By participating in the E.M.S. governments increase their credibility to fight inflation. Thus, the 
E.M.S. contributed to the reinforcement of conservative macroeconomic ideas introduced after the oil shocks. 
11 See Blinder (1998) for a digression on central banking. Blinder (1998, pp. 41) states: “the monetary authorities 
of many countries, especially in Europe, have displayed a willingness to maintain their tough anti-inflation 
stances to this very day, despite low inflation and persistently high unemployment.” 
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from the 1960's to 1998.12 Changes over time in policy responses to the economy could have several 
causes. A first reason relies on the historical evolution of macroeconomic thought. Because adopted 
policies reflect the dominant macroeconomic paradigm, solutions for econ mic problems may vary 
over time. A second reason focuses on the individuals who define monetary policy, and on those who 
can exert influence over them. Different individuals have different preferences thus, changes in 
monetary policy may occur if the individuals responsible for policy making change.13  
To estimate the time-varying parameter model three approaches were possible. First, one 
could estimate the model for sub-samples of the period analyzed and to test for structural breaks in 
parameter stimates.14 Second, one could estimate a recursive autoregressive model,15 which a ds a 
new observation to each new estimation not discarding old observations. And finally, one could use a 
rolling regression technique16 that adds a new observation to each run but drops the last observation, 
therefore keeping the sample size unchanged. The first method is adequate when the investigator 
wants to test for breaks in specific dates. Because my objective is to analyzing how parameter 
estimates evolve over time without imposing breaking dates, this approach was not followed. The 
second method does provide time-varying parameters but since the sample size is constantly 
increasing, the impact of the last observation on estimated coefficients' size decreases as the resear h r 
adds more observations to the sample. By using a rolling regression technique that keeps the sample 
size fixed, this shortcoming is overcome. I therefore decided to estimate monetary policy reaction 
functions by rolling regressions. The chosen sample size was ten years.  
                                            
12 All variables used to estimate monetary policy reaction functions are measured monthly and seasonally 
adjusted. The U.S. sample starts in January 1960 and ends in July 1998, while the Germany sample starts in 
January 1962 and ends in March 1998. 
13 In the U.S., several authors have documented the existence of temporal instability in reaction function 
parameter estimates. Most papers focus on the second reason above, i.e. changing policymakers, to justify 
parameter instability over time. See Hakes (1990), Gamber, Hakes and Shen (1998) among others. 
14 This is the approach followed by Hakes (1990) and Gamber, Hakes and Shen (1998). 
15 Bohara and Sauer (1995) used Kalman filtering to estimate monetary reaction functions for the U.S. and 
Germany. Johnson and Siklos (1996) use a recursive regression approach to a vector autoregression (VAR) 
model in order to obtain proxies of policymakers’ expectations about the state of the economy. They then 
estimate monetary policy reaction functions for seventeen OECD countries, but the coefficients are not allowed 
to vary over time. 
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The policy reaction functions I present were based on the monetary policy rule proposed by 
Taylor (1993, 1998). The basic idea is that for each period, the central bank has a target for the 
monetary policy instrument17 that depends upon the state of the economy. Taylor’s proposed rule was 
the following: 
 
R = p + gy + h(p – p*) + r*         (2) 
 
where, R is a short-term interest rate, p is the yearly inflation rate and y is the percentage deviation of 
real output from trend. The coefficients g andh measure, respectively, central bank responses to 
percentage deviations of output from trend and to inflation deviations from target (p*). r* stands for 
the real short-term interest rate target, that is, the real short-term interest rate that would prevail if 
inflation and output were at their targets. 
In his 1993 paper, Taylor proposed a value of 2 for the inflation and the real short-term 
interest rate targets, but in his 1998 paper he presents estimates where the inflation targe  is assumed to 
be zero and the real short-term interest rate target is estimated. I start by estimating reaction functions 
for the U.S. and Germany based on Taylor’s 1993 suggestions:18 
 
Rt = 2 + pt-1 + b(pt-1 - 2) + dyt-1 + et        (3) 
 
Where b and d are now coefficients to be estimated and et is the disturbance term. According 
to the stabilization objective, the central bank is expected to lower short-term interest raes if real 
                                                                                                                                
16 Murchison and Siklos (1998) estimated reac ion functions for a panel of 19 OECD countries. They use a 
rolling VAR to generate forecasts of unemployment and inflation, which are later incorporated in the reaction 
function. As in Johnson and Skilos (1996), their reaction function does not have time-varying para ters. 
17 For most central banks, the main monetary policy instrument is a short-t rm interest rate. Typically, it is an 
interbank lending rate for overnight loans.  
18 Most papers on the subject, namely Friedman and Kuttner (1996), assume that the monetary policy instrument 
depends on past values of economic variables. Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998-a, 1998-b), Clarida and Gertler 
(1996), Johnson and Siklos (1996) and Murchison and Siklos (1998) explicitly assume forward-looking central 
banks and use expected future values of the economic variables in their reaction function estimates. By 
employing lagged values of the policy objectives in the reaction functions, I do not exclude the hypothesis that 
central banks are forward looking because these lagged values are the most significant information used to form 
expectations about the future. 
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output lies below its trend level (a proxy for its potential level) and to raise them if inflation exceeds 
its target level. Therefore, a positive sign is expected for b, while a negative sign is expected for d.  
For the U.S., the dependent variable is the Federal Funds rate (FFR) since several authors 
[(Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Bernanke and Mihov, 1998; Blinder 1998; Goodfriend, 1991)] have 
argued that, for the whole sample period, the FFR is the best indicator of monetary policy regardless of 
the actual operating procedure used by the Federal Reserve. In Germany,19 si ce December 1974, the 
Bundesbank has been pre-announcing targets for the growth in broad money. However, Bernanke and 
Mihov (1998) consider the Bundesbank to be better described as an inflation targeter than a money 
stock targeter. They found that the Lombard rate and the call money rate could not be rejected as 
monetary policy indicators. I therefore use the call money rate as dependent variable in German 
monetary policy reaction functions. Clarida and Gertler (1996) also argue that, despite the focus on 
monetary aggregates, short-term interest rates are the best indicators of the Bundesbank's monetary 
policy.  
Turning to the independent variables, inflation rates were calculated as 12-month moving 
averages from Consumer Price Index series obtained from the IMF-IFS. To characterize the state of 
the real economy I used unemployment rates instead of output measures.20 Trends we  obtained via 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) using all past observations.  
Unit-root tests (Dickey-Fuller, 1981) were performed on short-term interest rates, inflation 
rates and unemployment deviations from trend for the two countries. In all cases I was able to reject 
the unit-root hypothesis. When estimating equation 3 for the U.S. and Germany, the error terms suffer 
from severe serial correlation, therefore generating biased standard errors. In order to obtain standard 
errors robust to autocorrelation I used the Newey and West (1987) correction method.  
                                            
19 For an overview of monetary policymaking in Germany see Clarida and Gertler (1996), and Issing (1997). 
20 This paper's focus on unemployment explains the decsion to use unemployment rates instead of real output 
measures. If one accepts the Okun’s law the two options are alternative. In fact, when measured for the whole 
period, the correlation between the percentage deviation of Industrial Production Index (GDP measures do not 
exist on a monthly basis) from trend and the deviation of unemployment from its trend level is 87% in the U.S. 
and 68% in Germany.  
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Results for the first set of estimations for the U.S. and Germany are presented in Figure 2 and 
Figure 3. Coefficient estimates are plotted along with two-standard- eviation intervals obtained by 
multiplying the standard error by plus or minus 1.96. Any point falling outside these bands is 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Recall that in each graph the coefficient estimate 
in a particular month corresponds to the estimate associated with that variable for the regression with 
the current month and the previous 119 months.  
[Figure 2] 
When looking at the graphs at least four things need to be highlighted. First, instability of 
parameter estimates over time does in fact exist. Just by adding a new observation to each run and 
dropping the last observation of the previous run, coefficient estimates sometimes vary considerably. 
Second, contrary to Taylor's predictions, the i flation coefficient (bUS) is statistically significant and 
negative for 10-year samples having their last observation between 1972 and 1983. A negative sign on 
bUS implies that when inflation rises, nominal FFR increase in a smaller proportion, decreasing real 
FFR. For the same time period the unemployment gap coefficient is statistically significant and 
negative. It therefore seems clear that monetary policy main objective during this period was to 
stabilize unemployment. It is important to notice that this period includes the inflation increases due to 
the first oil shock, suggesting that the Federal Reserve did not deliberately use monetary policy to 
reduce inflation. Third, the inflation coefficient is statistically significant and positive for samples with 
first/last observations between August 1980/August 1990 and June 1982/June 1992. This is probably 
capturing the Fed's strong response to increases in inflation after the second oil shock and may also 
reflect the monetarist experiment (1979 to 1982) under the chairmanship of Volcker. During this 
period the unemployment gap coefficient was statistically insignificant suggesting inflation as the 
most important variable. Fourth, after this period the FFR does not react to inflation deviations from 
target but in some estimations it responds to unemployment deviations from trend.  
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The combination of the two graphs clearly suggests that U.S. monetary policy rule has 
changed considerably over time.21 From the 60's to the beginning of the 80's the monetary policy 
threshold variable was unemployment,22 while later, with exceptions for some time periods, it is more 
difficult to establish which of the two variables was the policy focus.
Estimations of Taylor's 1993-policy rule for Germany are presented in Figure 3. Similar to the 
results for the U.S., for the first years of the sample the inflation gap coefficient is negative (although 
almost never statistically significant) while the unemployment gap coefficient is statistically 
significant, negative and large. As in the U.S., unemployment deviations from trend were the main 
focus of monetary policy responses to the state of the economy. This probably reflects the dominance 
of Keynesian interventionist ideas during this period. The inflation gap coefficient rises cnstantly 
until it reaches a stable value of 0.4 (statistically different from zero) for estimations having their last 
observations after 1990. The opposite occurs with the unemployment gap coefficient, which decreases 
in absolute value, and in the last years of the sample stops being statistically significant. 
[Figure 3] 
The presented empirical evidence clearly shows the development of conservative monetary 
policies in Germany over time. Short-term interest rate responses to inflati n have become more 
aggressive over time, while the reverse occurred with unemployment deviations from trend. For the 
U.S. the evidence is less clear. Although results suggest unemployment as the most important variable 
in the first half of the sample, during the second half of the sample, with some time period exceptions, 
the FFR seems in general less responsive to deviations of inflation or unemployment from target 
values. There is, however, a strong response in the 1980's to the second oil shock inflationary 
pressures. 
                                            
21 Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998-a) also found evidence of substantial differences in the way monetary policy 
was conducted in the U.S. pre- and post-October 1979. They concluded that only after Volcker became 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve did controlling inflation became the main objective of monetary policy. 
Moreover, in pre-Volker years monetary policy was “accommodative” since the Federal Reserve would increase 
nominal interest rates by less than the increase in anticipated inflation, therefore decreasing real interest rates, 
while after October 1979 the Federal Reserve would raise real interest rates.  
22 This is in accord with the results of Gamber, Hakes and Shen (1998). 
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In order to test the robustness of these results other specifications were estimated. First, I relax 
the assumptions for the target variables. In a 1998 paper, Taylor estimates his policy rule assuming a 
fixed zero inflation target over time and estimating the real short-term interest rate target.  
 
Rt = a + (1+b)pt-1 + dyt-1 + et         (4) 
 
It is important to realize that in Taylor's policy rule only one of the target value can be 
estimated. By assuming an inflation target of zero, the constant (a) reflects he monetary policy 
instrument target. However, if no assumptions are made about the inflation target, the same constant 
(a), in equation 4, is the sum of two components: the monetary policy instrument target (r*) and the 
negative of the inflation coeffi ient times the inflation target (-bp*). The introduction of the constant 
in the model therefore makes coefficient estimates more difficult to interpret. In this specification, 
both the inflation coefficient and the constant reflect central bank concens with inflation. Although 
not as clear as in the previous estimations, the results obtained with this specification23 once more 
suggested stronger anti-inflationary monetary policy in the second half of the sample.  
To refine the analysis I used a final specification, which allows for the central bank to have a 
smoothing objective on interest rates. Preliminary empirical work had suggested severe serial 
correlation in the error term, which is not surprising if we consider the monthly frequency of the series 
and the central bank objective for smoothing interest rates.24 Taylo 's specification only takes into 
account the stabilization objective. In reality, central banks typically do not adjust their monetary 
policy instrument immediately in response to new information and target changes usually occur in 
small steps. Taylor's policy rule can be extended to allow central banks to have a smoothing objective 
when setting interest rates by including lags of the policy instrument [h(L)Rt-1] in the reaction 
                                            
23 Results available from the author upon request. 
24 Goodfriend, (1991) suggests the minimization of surprise changes in rates and fear of disruption in financial 
markets as justifications for the smoothing objective.  
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function25 and by substituting the one-m th lagged yearly inflation rate by the one-month lagged 
monthly at annualized rate inflation (apt-1).26 
 
Rt = a + h(L)Rt-1 + bapt-1 + dyt-1 + et        (5) 
 
Twelve and nine lags of the dependent variable were included in the U.S. and German 
specifications respectively.27 Figure 4 presents U.S. results and Figure 5 German results.28  
[Figure 4] 
As can be seen from the graphs, in the first years of the sample both the inflation and 
unemployment gap coefficient were statistically significant confirming the adoption of Keynesian 
interventionist policies. The Federal Reserve response to inflationary pressures generated by the first 
oil shock does not seem to have been strong. However, the Fed seems to have reacted more 
aggressively to the second oil shock pressures as the larger size and statistical significance of the 
coefficients on annualized inflation (rolling samples from 1976-86 until 1980-90) suggest. In the last 
years of the sample the inflation coefficients stop being statistically significant, suggesting that the 
jump in FFR after the second oil shock was not followed by a decrease in the same variable 
sufficiently large to bring real FFR to its previous levels. In fact, in the last years of the sample none of 
the variables is statistically significant at the 5% significance level.  
[Figure 5] 
The evolution of estimated German inflation coefficients clearly shows the Bundesbank's 
strong response to inflation increases due to the two oil shocks. For estimations having the last 
observation after 1984 the coefficient is considerably smaller and for some estimations it is not even 
                                            
25 The optimal number of lags of the dependent variable was determined according to the Schwarz Bayesian 
Information Criterion. The Durbins’-h alternative was used to test for autocorrelation. 
26 apt-1 = [(1+minft-1)12-1]*100, where minft-1 = [(CPIt-1-CPIt-2)/CPIt-2] and CPI stands for the consumer price 
index. 
27 For the U.S. model, with eleven lags there is evidence of autocorrelation in the residuals. When including the 
12th lag the hypothesis of no autocorrelation can not be rejected and this lag is statistically significant. The 13th 
lag is not statistically significant. For Germany the 9th lag is statistically significant and the hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation can not be rejected. Including more lags in the model does not increase the adjusted-R squared.  
28 Only the coefficient estimates for inflation and the unemployment gap are presented in the paper. Results for 
the other variables estimated coefficients are available from the author upon reques . 
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statistically significant. If we combine this observation with the evolution of German inflation 
presented in Figure 1, this suggests that increases in real short-term interest rates after the oil shocks 
were not followed by decreases in nominal short-term interest rates proportional to inflation decreases, 
leading to higher real interest rates. The Bundesbank's response to unemployment deviations from 
trend was much stronger in the first half of the sample than in the second, onc more confirming a 
move towards conservative monetary policies.  
 
3.1.2 The Other European Union Countries 
To show that the other European Union nations also adopted conservative monetary policies after the 
second oil shock, Figure 6 presents data on yearly inflation rates and short-term nominal interest rates 
for each country.29 In all considered countries real short-term interest rates were much higher in the 
second half of the sample than in the first one. They increased consider bly in the late 1970's and have 
been high since then, even though inflation rates in the 1990's have decreased to levels similar to the 
1960's. 
[Figure 6] 
Recalling what has been said before, for the E.M.U. project to succeed governm nts had to 
consider exchange rate stability and inflation controls as primary goals. The evidence presented in 
these graphs helps to document the adoption of conservative monetary policies that focus on inflation 
control. 
 
4 Conclusion 
Empirical work on vote functions suggests that the percentage of votes incumbents had when elected 
and time in office consistently lead to a negative effect on the change in votes for incumbents. Among 
the economic variables, inflation, especially when measured relatively to the European average, 
                                            
29 To make results comparable across countries, data for the CPI and interest rates for all countries was extracted 
from the same source: the IMF-IFS. Regarding interest rates, I choose for each country the rate that applies to 
short-term borrowings between financial institutions. The IMF standardized name for this rate is the money 
market rate. The only exception is Ireland, for which the discount rate is used because the money market rate 
was only available for a short span of data [Johnson and Siklos (1996) used the same variable]. 
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appears as the main economic determinant of electoral results when variables are measured as 4-
quarter averages in the last year in office. There is also evidence that voters reward governments for 
real GDP growth, especially when this variable is measured over the entire term in office. Although 
none of the real economic variables seems to have a strong effect on electoral outcomes, 
unemployment is statistically significant less often.  
I argue that policymakers' understanding of the behavior of the economy plays an important 
role in determining electoral results, since it influences voters' perceptions of what macroeconomic 
policy can achieve and which objectives it should pursue. I therefore studied policymaker's attitudes 
towards unemployment and inflation. Three reasons were discussed for the creation of a neo-liber l 
consensus among leaders of E.U. countries: (1) the policy failure of Keynesian interventionist policies, 
of the full-employment type, after the first oil shock; (2) the development of monetarist ideas as a 
viable alternative to solve stagflation; (3) the examples of Germany and the U.S., which by adopting 
conservative monetarist policies managed to overcome the economic problems created by the oil 
shocks better than the average western European countries.  
To test the last argument, time-varying monetary policy reaction functions, for the U.S. and 
Germany were estimated. For both countries there is strong evidence that monetary policy responses to 
unemployment deviations from trend decreased considerably over time and that during the first years 
of the sample unemployment was the main focus of monetary policy. Both in the U.S. and Germany 
real interest rates are much higher in the 1980's and 1990's than in the 1960's d 1970's. There is also 
evidence that in general, all E.U. nations adopted policies of high real short-term interest rates at the 
end of the 1970's. This change in policies suggests that among policymakers, the unemployment 
aversion that existed before the 1970's as a consequence of the Great Depression has been replaced by 
inflation concerns after the 1970's due to a series of supply side shocks and the willingness to achieve 
monetary integration.  
I consider the development of this neo-liberal consensus among European leaders and the 
willingness to achieve monetary union as possible explanations for governments to go unpunished for 
the increase and persistence of unemployment in Europe. On one hand, the change from 
interventionist Keynesian ideas to market-oriented policies has decreased governments' responsibility 
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for macroeconomic outcomes. On the other hand, the willingness to achieve monetary integration gave 
politicians an entity, the E.M.U., to blame for domestic problems. Although unemployment as always 
been present during electoral campaigns, it is seen as a necessary evil to achieve monetary integration. 
This argument has been used alike by left and right-wi g governments and this may be why empirical 
results on vote functions don’t show any clear evidence that voters hold incumbents from different 
ideologies more responsible for certain economic variables than others. The fact that most European 
countries are facing the same problem has also contributed to make governments less responsible for 
unemployment. 
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Table 1 Vote Functions: 4-Quarter Averages of Economic Variables 
Vote share in preceding election -.27*** -.27*** -.17** -.26*** -27*** 
 (-4.0) (-3.8) (-2.0) (-3.9) (-3.9) 
Quarters in office -.44*** -.40*** -.69*** -.45*** -.38** 
 (-2.8) (-2.6) (-3.1) (-2.9) (-2.6) 
Economic performance variables      
Changes in Inflation -5.61* -5.15** -3.38   
 (-1.8) (-2.2) (-.8)   
Changes in Unemployment -2.70     
 (-1.0)     
Real GDP Growth Rate  1.66*    
  (1.9)    
Real Private Consumption Growth Rate   1.66   
   (1.2)   
Changes in Relative Inflation    -7.40** -6.99*** 
    (-2.2) (-2.8) 
Changes in Relative Unemployment    -.14  
    (-.04)  
Relative Real GDP Growth Rate     1.21 
     (1.2) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.276 0.282 0.179 0.286 0.299 
 
Notes:  The coefficients on the dummies included to control for fixed effects are not reported.
 t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 2 Vote Functions: Entire Period in Office
Vote share in preceding election -.30*** -.34*** -.15* -.28*** -.30*** 
 (-3.8) (-4.3) (-1.8) (-3.5) (-3.8) 
Quarters in office -.44** -.40** -.75*** -.43** -.37** 
 (-2.4) (-2.5) (-3.4) (-2.3) (-2.3) 
Economic performance variables      
Changes in Inflation .47 -1.70 2.88   
 (.07) (-.3) (.4)   
Changes in Unemployment -1.23     
 (-1.3)     
Real GDP Growth Rate  1.92**    
  (2.1)    
Real Private Consumption Growth Rate   1.78*   
   (1.9)   
Changes in Relative Inflation    -3.61 -3.78 
    (-.4) (-.7) 
Changes in Relative Unemployment    1.01  
    (.1)  
Relative Real GDP Growth Rate     1.10 
     (.9) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.213 0.270 0.223 0.202 0.245 
 
Notes:  The coefficients on the dummies included to control for fixed effects are not reported.
 t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 *** significant at the1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 1 Inflation and Nominal Interest Rates30 
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30 Interest rates are annualized monthly rates. Inflation rates are annual and calculated from monthly consumer 
price indexes. 
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Figure 2 Taylors’ Policy Rule (r*=2 and p*=2) for the U.S. 
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Notes: The boldface series represent coefficient estimates, the other series are two-standard- eviation intervals 
(±1.96*SE). 
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Figure 3 Taylors’ Policy Rule (r*=2 and p*=2) for Germany 
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Notes: The boldface series represent coefficient estimates, the other series are two-standard- eviation intervals 
(±1.96*SE). 
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Figure 4 Taylor’s Rule for the U.S. Admitting a Smoothing Objective
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Notes: The boldface series represent coefficient estimates, the other series are two-standard- eviation intervals 
(±1.96*SE). 
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Figure 5 Taylor’s Rule for Germany Admitting a Smoothing Objective 
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Notes: The boldface series represent coefficient estimates, the other series are two-standard- eviation intervals 
(±1.96*SE). 
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Figure 6 Inflation and short-term nominal interest rates 
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9
2
1
9
9
6
Portugal
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
6
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
6
Spain
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
6
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
6
Sweden
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
6
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
6
United Kingdom
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
6
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
6
 
Notes:  Data is annual and was obtained from the IMF-IFS. Boldface series represent short- erm interest rates, 
other series are annual inflation rates calculated from the Consumer Price Index.  
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Appendix 1 Political data sources 
 
 
Alesina, Alberto; Cohen, Gerald and Roubini, Nouriel (1997), Political Cycles and the 
Macroeconomy, Cambridge and London, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Alt, James (1985), “Political parties, world demand, and unemployment: domestic and international 
sources of economic activity,” The American Political Science Review, 79: 1016-1040. 
 
Ameringer, Charles - d. (1983), Political Parties of Europe, USA: Greenwood Press. 
 
Ameringer, Charles - d. (1992), Political Parties of the Americas, 1980s to 1990s: Canada, Latin 
America, and the West Indies, USA: Greenwood Press. 
 
Banks, A. (several issues) Political Handbook of the World. State University of New York at 
Binghampton: CSA Publications. 
 
Chris, Cook and Paxton, John (1992), European Political Facts, 1918-90, New York: Facts on File. 
 
Day, Alan; German, Richard; and Campbell, John (1996), Political Parties of the World (4th ed.), 
USA and Canada: Stockton Press.  
 
Delury, George (1987), World Encyclopedia of Political Systems & Parties, USA: Facts on File 
Publications. 
 
Gorvin, Ian (1989), Elections since 1945: a worldwide reference compendium, Harlow, Essex, U.K: 
Logman; Chicago, Ill., USA: St. James Press. 
 
The World Europa Year Book (several issues), London, England: Europa Publications Limited. 
 
Woldendorp, Jaap; Keman, Hans and Budge, Ian (1998), “Party government in 20 democracies: an 
update (1990-1995),” European Journal of Political Research, 33: 125-164. 
 
